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INTRODUCTION 
Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution gives the President the 
power, “by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make 
Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur.”1 The 
Supremacy Clause gives treaties—like federal statutes—the status of 
supreme law in the constitutional system.2 But the process for 
concluding treaties differs markedly from the process for passing an act 
of Congress. First, the Constitution’s normal lawmaking powers reside 
in Article I,3 but the Treaty Clause rests in Article II with the 
President’s powers.4 Second, states can typically make their own law 
alongside federal legislation, but the Constitution expressly forbids 
states from entering into any “Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation.”5 
Third, the Constitution requires that acts of Congress earn the approval 
of only a majority of the House and the Senate and signature from the 
President to become law; whereas treatymaking requires leadership 
from the President and approval by a supermajority of present senators 
but no formal input or approval from the House of Representatives.6 
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 1.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 2.  Id. art. VI, § 2. 
 3.  Id. art. I, § 1. 
 4.  Id. art. II, § 2. 
 5.  Id. art. I, § 10. 
 6.  Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
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Many endeavors to rationalize the treaty power’s peculiarities start 
with the distinction between domestic and foreign lawmaking. What 
might explain the differences between the treaty and legislative powers 
is that foreign affairs raise unique concerns and therefore require 
unusual procedures. After all, American foreign relations were 
precarious when the Constitution was ratified—America’s survival was 
not assured, and the new government needed safeguards to ensure that 
it arranged its foreign affairs carefully.7 But one does not need to 
separate foreign lawmaking from domestic lawmaking to make sense 
of the treaty power. Rather, this Note argues that an understanding of 
collective action—defined broadly as “action taken by or on behalf of 
groups of individuals”8—can explain the treaty power just as collective 
action reasoning can illuminate Congress’s Article I powers.9 But 
where much of the Constitution enables collective action by 
empowering a simple legislative majority to act,10 the Treaty Clause 
imposes a higher procedural bar to restrain collective action and 
prevent states in the majority from exploiting states in the minority. 
Preratification history is essential to understanding the treaty 
power through a collective action framework. Founding-era regional 
tension was the primary factor that shaped the Treaty Clause. States 
worried that their fellow sovereigns would abuse the treaty power to 
enjoy the benefits of a treaty themselves while imposing the costs 
 
 7.  See GEORGE WILLIAM VAN CLEVE, WE HAVE NOT A GOVERNMENT: THE ARTICLES 
OF CONFEDERATION AND THE ROAD TO THE CONSTITUTION 17 (2017) (“The 1783 Treaty of 
Peace greatly expanded the United States’ boundaries . . . . But the peace terms had strong 
enemies in Britain, other major European powers, and Native Americans.”). 
 8.  MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE 
THEORY OF GROUPS 5 (1965). 
 9.  See Robert D. Cooter & Neil Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General Theory of 
Article I, Section 8, 63 STAN. L. REV. 115, 117 (2010) (explaining that under the Articles of 
Confederation, states could not protect themselves from foreign military war or interstate 
commercial war because they “acted individually when they needed to act collectively”). 
 10.  See Part I, infra. Several provisions of the Constitution addressed a primary weakness of 
the Articles of Confederation—the inability of the Confederation Congress to solve collective 
action problems among the states. See Cooter & Siegel, supra note 9, at 117 (“Article I, Section 8 
of the new Constitution gave Congress additional powers to address collective action problems.”). 
For example, the Confederation faced extreme debt from fighting the Revolutionary War, but 
the Articles did not empower the Confederation Congress to raise revenues to pay down that 
debt. See VAN CLEVE, supra note 7, at 48 (“By far the most momentous problem facing both 
American leaders and many ordinary citizens after the war was a giant overhang of debt.”). The 
new Constitution avoided such a collective action problem by fixing the power to raise revenues 
firmly within Congress’s enumerated powers. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. Because the states could 
not coordinate to collectively fund the demands of their shared government, Congress would be 
empowered to raise funds directly. See Cooter & Siegel, supra note 9, at 119 (“The theory of 
collective action federalism interprets the clauses of Section 8 as authorizing Congress to tax, 
spend, and regulate when two or more states face collective action problems.”). 
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elsewhere. The Treaty Clause embodies that tension: It empowers some 
collective action among the states, but action is still restrained by the 
Treaty Clause’s procedural requirements, which ensure that a majority 
of states cannot form a treaty that exploits a minority. 
Because the interstate tension that shaped the Treaty Clause has 
long-since dissipated, the Clause restrains collective action and makes 
forming treaties too difficult today. The modern preference for non-
Article II agreements (e.g., congressional-executive agreements) 
supports that notion. Accordingly, non-Article II processes may be 
most appropriate for agreements that distribute benefits and costs 
evenly among states. Although identifying such treaties is likely a 
value-driven exercise, some examples might be those that set national 
policies applicable to all states, such as regulations pertaining to capital 
punishment or national greenhouse gas emissions standards. Although 
collective action reasoning is useful for understanding the origins of the 
treaty clause, it does not fully delineate which agreements should, as a 
normative matter, pass through the Article II process. Moreover, it does 
not explain, as a descriptive matter, the split in modern practice 
between those agreements that pass through the Article II process and 
those that do not. 
Part I of this Note will briefly explain collective action reasoning. 
Part II will examine treatymaking under the Articles of Confederation 
and other preratification history that informs our understanding of the 
Treaty Clause. Part III will explore the extent to which collective action 
reasoning influenced the Framers as they debated the treaty power 
during the drafting and ratification of the Constitution. It will sample 
debates over the Treaty Clause at the Constitutional Convention and 
the Virginia and North Carolina ratification conventions. Part IV will 
first examine the original assumptions behind the treaty power and 
whether they should continue to inform our procedures for modern 
international agreements. Next, it will consider non-Article II 
international agreements and evaluate what their prevalence means for 
the collective action understanding of the treaty process. Lastly, Part V 
will consider the criticisms and limits of understanding the treaty power 
through a collective action framework. 
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I. COLLECTIVE ACTION AND TREATYMAKING 
Treatymaking can be understood as a collective action problem.11 
A collective action problem occurs when members of a group face a 
common problem, but something (e.g., competing incentives, 
inadequate communication, information asymmetries, etc.) prevents 
them from cooperating to solve it.12 Often, the factor that prevents 
cooperation is the incentive to act self-interestedly, rather than to 
maximize the whole group’s well-being.13 
Members in a group can more easily act together when doing so 
does not require unanimous approval, but any threshold below 
unanimity may subject the minority to the majority’s will. The 
difference between interstate compacts and congressional legislation 
illustrates this relationship between collective action and minority 
exploitation. Interstate compacts require unanimity from participating 
states.14 But Congress can pass a federal law through a majoritarian 
process and impose solutions that the states would not reach 
otherwise.15 Legislating based on majority rule reduces the threat of 
holdouts—that one state will hold up the entire project to draw out 
more concessions—but it raises the risk that the legislative majority will 
exploit the minority.16 Acting on majority rule through Congress thus 
produces a tradeoff between facilitating collective action and 
protecting the minority.17 
 
 11.  “Collective action” is a broad term that encompasses many different types of behavior 
within a group. See generally Clint Peinhardt & Todd Sandler, Principles of Collective Action and 
Game Theory, in TRANSNATIONAL COOPERATION: AN ISSUE-BASED APPROACH (2015) (using 
introductory game theory to explain general principles of collective action and common 
archetypes of collective action problems). This Note uses the term in the context of the Treaty 
Clause to refer to a situation where states have narrowly self-interested reasons to support or 
oppose entering the United States into an international agreement. 
 12.  Vincent McGuire, The Collective Action Problem, https://spot.colorado.edu/~mcguire/ 
collact.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2021). 
 13.  See OLSON, supra note 8, at 2 (“If the members of a large group rationally seek to 
maximize their personal welfare, they will not act to advance their common or group objectives 
unless there is coercion to force them to do so, or unless some separate incentive . . . is offered to 
the members of the group . . . .”); see also Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, 
Collective Action, and Law, 102 MICH. L. REV. 71, 71–72 (2003) (amending Olson’s logic to 
suggest that individuals in a group are motivated not by purely rational calculations, but by a 
“more emotionally nuanced reciprocal” posture under which the decision to cooperate or not is 
also motivated by what other individuals decide). 
 14.  See Cooter & Siegel, supra note 9, at 140. 
 15.  See id. at 144 (“The central government operating through majority rule can find 
solutions that elude states cooperating through unanimity rule.”). 
 16.  See id. at 142 (“Switching from unanimity rule to majority rule ameliorates the problem 
of holdouts, but it creates a new problem: minority exploitation.”). 
 17.  See id. at 144 (“Empowering Congress animates collective action, but risks exploiting 
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The state compact example provides general lessons that can apply 
in other collective action contexts. When parties lack a centralized 
system through which they can collectively act, they must resort to ad 
hoc agreements to solve collective problems. Parties pursue agreements 
that promote their own interests, and each agreement binds only the 
parties that consent to it. When each party is free to participate (or 
defect) at-will, collective action requires unanimity. But groups can 
avoid this unanimity requirement by acting through a central 
government, which facilitates collective action through a less-than-
unanimity rule.18 
Using these concepts, treatymaking can be understood through a 
collective action framework. Foreign relations is an area where states 
must act as a collective and speak with one voice.19 It makes intuitive 
sense that individual states cannot effectively conduct foreign relations 
for the whole country, and this intuition is reflected in doctrines like 
preemption and the assignment of some powers exclusively to the 
executive in the foreign affairs context.20 
If a federal process for making treaties did not exist, states that 
wanted to enter treaties could only offer foreign nations the resources 
or cooperation of other consenting states in the treaty. This effective 
unanimity requirement would mean that the nation would ultimately 
make few treaties because few would win unanimous approval from the 
states. 
Article I, Section 9 of the U.S. Constitution prohibits states from 
entering treaties themselves, meaning that if the states want to make 
 
states in the minority.”). 
 18.  See Peinhardt & Sandler, supra note 11, at 21 (explaining that institutional design can 
help solve collective action problems through cost sharing and other schemes that shape actors’ 
incentives). 
 19.  See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427 n.25 (1964) (noting that 
various constitutional provisions and statutes reflected “a concern for uniformity in this country’s 
dealings with foreign nations” and indicated “a desire to give matters of international significance 
to the jurisdiction of federal institutions”). 
 20.  See, e.g., Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. 1, 30 (2015) (holding that 
Congress could not regulate the President’s exercise of the recognition power because doing so 
would “prevent the Nation from speaking with one voice” and “prevent the Executive itself from 
doing so in conducting foreign relations”); Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 409 (2012) 
(holding that federal immigration law preempted several provisions of state immigration law in 
part because decisions that bear on the removability of foreign nationals “touch on foreign 
relations and must be made with one voice”); Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 
363, 381 (2000) (finding that a state law restricting state business with Burma was preempted by 
federal law in part because it “compromise[d] the very capacity of the President to speak for the 
Nation with one voice in dealing with other governments”). 
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treaties, they must do so by working together through the federal 
government.21 But under the federal treatymaking power, treaties can 
come into being with less than unanimous approval from the states.22 
Instead, two-thirds of states can—through their senators—commit the 
whole nation to a treaty.23 By requiring less than unanimity from the 
states, the treaty power thus enables collective action. But the 
supermajority requirement for treaties also restrains collective 
action—particularly in comparison to Congress’s majority-rule 
functions. This restraint represents a decision to err on the side of 
preventing minority exploitation by making collective action harder. 
It is significant that a minority of states can block a treaty because 
treaties can reach substantive areas in which small groups of states 
might self-interestedly oppose collective action.24 For example, a treaty 
that settles a boundary dispute to avoid international conflict might 
protect the whole country from the peril and cost of war, but the state 
or region asked to cede territory might be inclined to hold out for a 
different resolution. Alternatively, an international trade deal that 
secures lower-cost foreign goods may benefit consumers nation-wide, 
but states with companies that produce substitute goods might oppose 
the deal. 
There are multiple ways to view the treaty power in a collective 
action framework. For example, when treaties create obligations on 
behalf of the states, the federal government faces a potential collective 
action problem in getting states to comply.25 By the same token, nations 
can use treaties to solve international collective action problems.26 
 
 21.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9; see also John C. Calhoun, Speech in the Commercial Convention 
with Great Britain (Jan. 9, 1816), in 2 THE WORKS OF JOHN C. CALHOUN 132 (Richard K. Cralle 
ed., 1864) (discussing the treaty power and remarking that in relation to the rest of the world, “the 
states disappear” so that the country can present “the exterior of undivided sovereignty”). 
 22.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  See David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of the 
Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075, 1089–90 (2000) (noting that 
the Framers could have easily limited the substantive reach of the treaty power but chose not to, 
producing the clear implication that “the President and Senate can make treaties on any subject 
appropriate for negotiation and agreement among the states”). 
 25.  See, e.g., JAMES MADISON, VICES OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATES 
(1787), reprinted in 2 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, COMPRISING HIS PUBLIC PAPERS AND 
HIS PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE, INCLUDING HIS NUMEROUS LETTERS AND DOCUMENTS 
NOW FOR THE FIRST TIME PRINTED 362 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1901) (“[N]ot a year has passed 
without instances of [treaty violations] in some one or other of the States. The Treaty of peace—
the treaty with France—the treaty with Holland have each been violated.”). 
 26.  Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 435 (U.S. 1920) (upholding the Migratory Bird Treaty 
Act of 1918 as a constitutional implementation of a treaty between the United States and Great 
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Further, allowing the President, a unitary actor, to control treaty 
negotiations mitigates collective action problems that would result if a 
more numerous body, like the Senate or full Congress, had the power 
to negotiate directly with foreign countries.27 While these and other 
suggestions are worthy areas for study, this Note will focus on the 
history of the Treaty Clause itself and the extent to which that history 
reflects collective action reasoning. 
II. TREATIES AND COLLECTIVE ACTION BEFORE THE 
CONSTITUTION 
The Articles of Confederation imposed a high procedural bar that 
made it difficult for the states to collectively form treaties with foreign 
powers. That restraint played out in the Jay-Gardoqui treaty 
negotiations between the Confederation and Spain, which can be 
understood as an example of restrained collective action among the 
states. This Part will first discuss the treaty power under the Articles of 
Confederation and how it influenced the controversy surrounding the 
Jay-Gardoqui treaty. Next, it will consider how the Jay-Gardoqui 
controversy may have affected delegates’ attitudes heading into the 
Constitutional Convention. 
A.  The Articles of Confederation and the Jay-Gardoqui Controversy 
The Articles of Confederation centralized the treatymaking power 
in the Confederation Congress.28 Each state could send up to seven 
delegates to the Congress, but delegates voted together such that each 
state had one vote.29 Article IX imposed a supermajority threshold, 
requiring agreement from nine of the thirteen states to conclude a 
treaty.30 Under Article VI, individual states could not circumvent this 
process—any state seeking to make its own “conference, agreement, 
 
Britain and noting that the national interest at issue “can be protected only by national action in 
concert with that of another power”). 
 27.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 75, at 389 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey & James 
McClellan eds., 2001) (explaining that the “variable and . . . numerous” nature of the House of 
Representatives was incompatible with the qualities needed to properly execute the treatymaking 
power). 
 28.  Golove, supra note 24, at 1103. 
 29.  See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, THE FRAMER’S COUP: THE MAKING OF THE UNITED 
STATES CONSTITUTION 725 n.182 (2016) (“All states were entitled to send seven delegates to the 
Confederation Congress—who would collectively cast their state’s one vote—but none of them 
in fact sent that many, and many states regularly failed to send even the two delegates that were 
required for a state’s vote to count.”). 
 30.  ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. IX, para. 1. 
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alliance or treaty” with a foreign power would need the consent of 
Congress.31 
This construction of the treaty power was highly flawed in light of 
Congress’s limited powers to legislate. Congress could make treaties 
but often could not pass laws to ensure that states would abide by 
them.32 As a result, states could—and often did—violate the nation’s 
treaties.33 The gulf between Congressional treaty power and legislative 
power thus enabled states to flout treaty obligations in their own self-
interest and imperil the nation as a whole.34 
But setting aside the question of Congress’s legislative power, the 
treaty power under the Articles was beneficial in a narrower sense. At 
a time when state identity likely superseded national identity,35 the 
treaty power prevented one group of states—even a majority of 
states—from concluding a treaty at the expense of another group. The 
supermajority requirement gave a small number of states effective veto 
power over any proposed treaty, preventing a majority of states from 
using the power of Congress to advance an interest that was sectional 
rather than truly national.36 
The minority veto power served that exact function in the Jay-
Gardoqui treaty controversy. During that controversy, northern and 
southern states split on the question of whether the states’ navigation 
rights to the Mississippi River should be exchanged in a treaty with 
 
 31.  Id. art. VI, para. 2. 
 32.  See Golove, supra note 24, at 1103 (“Charged with the conduct of American foreign 
affairs, Congress would inevitably seek to make treaties on subjects falling outside the scope of 
its limited legislative authority.”). 
 33.  See MADISON, supra note 25, at 362 (noting that states had imperiled the whole country 
by violating treaties with foreign powers and asserting that “it ought to be least in the power of 
any part of the Community to bring [foreign aggression] on the whole”). 
 34.  See Golove, supra note 24, at 1103 (“[C]onflicts over the treaty power and states’ rights 
were recurrent under the Confederation . . . states’ rights proponents did succeed in creating 
controversy and uncertainty and sometimes even in seriously subverting Congress’s foreign policy 
initiatives—indeed, so severely as to place the peace of the nation in jeopardy.”). 
 35.  See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. II (asserting that under the Articles of 
Confederation, each state retained its “sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every 
power, jurisdiction, and right” not expressly delegated to the Confederation Congress). 
 36.  See Golove, supra note 24, at 1099. In describing the supermajority requirement that the 
Constitution would contain, which was effectively equal to the supermajority requirement under 
the Articles, Golove explains that it enabled the “special political task of refusing . . . any treaty 
that trenched too far on the interests of states without serving a sufficiently powerful 
countervailing national interest.” Id. Golove thus casts the minority veto as a tool for states to 
guard against the tensions of state versus national interests. But for some conflicts, the tension 
can be restated as between the interests of a minority of states and the incompatible interests of 
a majority states who—without a supermajority requirement—could assert their interests as 
emblematic of the national interest. 
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Spain. Were it not for the Articles’ supermajority requirement for 
treaties, the treaty may have been ratified. 
The southern states valued their access to the Mississippi River 
because it had preserved their connection with the many southerners 
who had already settled in the west and represented their prospects for 
further expansion that could increase the south’s power in the union.37 
The river had long been of strategic importance. Spain controlled the 
river’s mouth before and during the American Revolution; it had 
granted Great Britain free navigation of the river, but the rebelling 
colonies could no longer claim that right.38 By 1778, a handful of 
southern states claimed territory between the Ohio and Mississippi 
rivers, but they all recognized that access to the west would have little 
use if the Mississippi were unavailable to move products to the sea.39 
At the end of the American Revolution, the Treaty of Paris 
purported to promise the states free navigation of the Mississippi, but 
Spain failed to mention navigation of the Mississippi in its own peace 
treaty with Great Britain.40 When Americans poured west after the 
Revolution, Spain reasserted its right to control navigation of the river, 
and by 1785, it regularly seized American vessels using the river for 
what it deemed to be illegal trade.41 
With the threat of war looming, Spain sent a minister, Don Diego 
de Gardoqui, to the United States with authority to offer a commercial 
treaty in exchange for Congress’s recognition that Spain controlled the 
Mississippi.42 Congress initially instructed Jay to hold firm on 
America’s claims to the Mississippi.43 But commercial conditions in the 
north worsened as Jay and Gardoqui negotiated—British interference 
with northern states’ fishery rights spelled “practical ruin to the 
shipping interest of New York and New England.”44 With the promise 
 
 37.  See KLARMAN, supra note 29, at 54 (noting that most western settlers came from the 
south and that “many southerners hoped that westward expansion ultimately would lead to the 
creation of several western states”). 
 38.  Charles Warren, The Mississippi River and the Treaty Clause of the Constitution, 2 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 271, 277 (1934). 
 39.  Id. at 276. 
 40.  KLARMAN, supra note 29, at 49. 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  Id. at 49–50. 
 43.  Report of the Committee, Aug. 25, 1785, in 29 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL 
CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 658 (Library of Congress ed., 1904) [hereinafter CONT. CONG. 
JOURNALS] (“That the Secretary to the United States for the Department of [F]oreign Affairs be 
and he is hereby instructed . . . particularly to stipulate the right of the United States to their 
territorial bounds, and the free Navigation of the Mississippi, from the source to the Ocean.”). 
 44.  Warren, supra note 38, at 282. 
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that intercourse with Spain would secure northern industry, northern 
states became willing to concede American rights to the west.45 Finally, 
Jay himself became convinced that some concession of western 
interests was necessary if a treaty with Spain were to take form.46 He 
thus proposed that Congress give him new instructions that would let 
him sacrifice the American claim to the Mississippi for twenty-five 
years.47 
Jay’s request for reinstruction stirred great controversy. 
Southerners who saw their future in the west perceived Jay’s proposal 
as an unjust abuse of Congress’s power.48 Meanwhile, northern states 
“felt strongly on the subject of their devastated commerce and were 
little inclined to allow theoretical Western rights to stand in the way of 
the chances for their own increased prosperity.”49 The regional division 
crystallized when Congress finally voted on the question of whether to 
reinstruct Jay—Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, 
Connecticut, New York, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey voted for the 
measure, while Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
and Georgia voted against it.50 Although a majority of states had voted 
for reinstruction, the opposing minority would be able to block any 
subsequent treaty.51 
B. Regional Tension Heading into the Constitutional Convention 
The Jay-Gardoqui controversy can be understood as an instance of 
restraining collective action to prevent minority exploitation, and it 
created significant regional tension in the years preceding the 
Constitutional Convention. Framed in collective action terms, northern 
states wanted to secure a treaty with Spain that allocated benefits to 
the northern majority—in the form of a commercial boon for northern 
fisheries—while imposing costs on the southern minority by limiting 
access to the Mississippi River and hindering western expansion. As 
South Carolina’s Charles Pinckney perceived the attempted treaty, it 
represented a policy that was “calculated to acquire benefits for one 
 
 45.  See id. at 283 (“[S]elf interest led these [northern states] to join with the opponents of 
the West and to contend that Congress should allow Jay to obtain favorable terms of commercial 
intercourse from Spain, by a concession as to the Western rights.”). 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  Id. at 284–85. 
 50.  Id. at 285. Delaware was absent from the vote. Id. 
 51.  See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
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part of the confederacy at the expence [sic] of the other.”52 If the 
Articles had required a simple majority of states to make a treaty, the 
northern states likely would have succeeded.53 A majority of states 
would have acted collectively, but it would have come at the expense of 
the minority. 
Even though the Jay-Gardoqui treaty did not come into force, the 
controversy surrounding it aggravated regional tensions and sowed 
regional distrust in the years leading up to the Constitutional 
Convention. Some believed that the northern states were willing to 
sacrifice the Mississippi in order to “keep[] the weight of [government] 
and population” in the north and east, and they would have rather seen 
the Union destroyed than fail in their effort.54 Looking ahead to the 
potential for a new government, James Madison predicted that “unless 
the project to yield . . . the Mississippi for twenty-five years be 
abandoned by Congress, the hopes of carrying [Virginia] into a proper 
federal system will be demolished.”55 Madison thus echoed a sentiment 
similar to Pinckney’s: Navigation of the Mississippi was an interest 
itself, but it also had serious implications for southern states’ place in 
the national order. 
Some northern delegates reciprocated the southern delegates’ 
mistrust and held similarly strong views about their southern 
counterparts after the Jay-Gardoqui controversy. Rufus King of 
Massachusetts doubted whether it was really in the northern states’ 
interest to preserve the south’s ability for westward expansion. 
Doubting that the nation would ever raise “a penny of revenue” from 
western settlers, he wrote, “I should consider every emigrant to that 
country from the Atlantic states as forever lost to the Confederacy.”56 
Theodore Sedgwick—also of Massachusetts—similarly doubted if 
cooperation was in the northern states’ interests and encouraged the 
 
 52.  Charles Pinckney, Speech, In Answer to Mr. Jay, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, on the 
Question of a treaty with Spain (Aug. 16, 1786), in 31 CONT. CONG. JOURNALS, supra note 43, at 
945. For Pinckney, the controversy extended beyond the particular treaty at issue and cast doubt 
on the Confederation Congress’s viability as a government. He questioned whether states that 
felt themselves injured by an imbalanced treaty would continue to trust Congress to wield its 
power: “Will [the injured states] not urge . . . the impropriety of vesting that body with further 
powers, which has so recently abused those they already possess?” Id. 
 53.  See Warren, supra note 38, at 285. 
 54.  Letter from James Monroe to Patrick Henry (Aug. 12, 1786) in 8 LETTERS OF MEMBERS 
OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1785-1789, at 424–25 (Edmund C. Burnett ed., 1936) 
[hereinafter CONT. CONG. LETTERS]. 
 55.  Warren, supra note 38, at 287. 
 56.  Id. at 286. 
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northern states to seriously “consider what advantages result to them 
from their connection with the southern states.”57 
These statements, although merely samples of the sentiment 
leading up to the Constitutional Convention, reflect strong distrust 
between groups of states who needed to cooperate to secure a peaceful 
and prosperous future through international agreements. The Articles’ 
supermajority requirement for treaties kept the Confederation from 
concluding the controversial treaty with Spain. But for many 
southerners, the treaty came uncomfortably close to fruition. For 
Monroe and many of his fellow Virginians, the Jay-Gardoqui affair and 
the division it fomented became a substantial driving force behind the 
Constitutional Convention.58 But whatever changes southern delegates 
to the Constitutional Convention had envisioned for a new system of 
government, they “embarked on constitutional reform with vivid 
memories” of the Jay-Gardoqui negotiations.59 
III.  COLLECTIVE ACTION AND TREATIES DURING DRAFTING AND 
RATIFICATION 
The Framers and Ratifiers were acutely aware that an 
insufficiently-restrained treaty power could empower the tyranny of 
the majority. At times, the delegates stated explicitly that restraining 
the treaty power was one of their goals.60 Further, a clear pattern 
emerged among their proposals: Many offered ways to limit the treaty 
power by procedural means.61 This part will first show that fear of 
minority state exploitation motivated debates over the Treaty Clause 
at the Constitutional Convention. Next, it will demonstrate that the 
same concern resurfaced during the ratification debates in Virginia and 
North Carolina. Lastly, it will briefly describe the diversity of 
viewpoints in the broader ratification discussions. 
 
 57.  Letter from Theodore Sedgwick to Caleb Strong (Aug. 6, 1787), in 8 CONT. CONG. 
LETTERS, supra note 54, at 415. 
 58.  See Lance Banning, Virginia: Sectionalism and the Common Good, in RATIFYING THE 
CONSTITUTION 261, 267 (discussing some Virginians’ reactions to the Jay-Gardoqui controversy 
and noting that “no other episode . . . engendered such intense and uniform emotional revulsion” 
or “suggested so convincingly how chronic differences between New England and Virginia could 
suddenly erupt in pressing dangers”). 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 393 (Max Farrand. ed., 
1911) [hereinafter RECORDS]. 
 61.  See infra note 67 and accompanying text. 
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A.  The Constitutional Convention 
Statements at the Constitutional Convention speak directly to the 
Framers’ goal of limiting the new government’s treatymaking power. 
When an early version of the treaty power gave the responsibility to 
the Senate alone, Madison—likely recalling the Jay-Gardoqui affair—
advocated for including another procedural hurdle. He observed “that 
the Senate represented the States alone, and that . . . it was proper that 
the President should be an agent in Treaties.”62 Requiring approval 
from the President would add another procedural check on the 
treatymaking process, and one from an official who would be 
accountable to all voters by virtue of a national electorate. Gouverneur 
Morris of Pennsylvania was unsure that the treaty power should rest 
with the Senate, and he moved to amend the power to clarify that no 
treaty would be binding on the country unless implemented by a 
corresponding act of Congress.63 He argued that the Framers should 
craft a deliberately onerous treatymaking process because it would be 
disadvantageous to multiply the country’s treaty obligations.64 “The 
more difficulty in making treaties,” he explained, “the more value will 
be set on them.”65 
Other proposed modifications, some adopted and many unadopted, 
show that the Framers looked to procedural mechanisms to restrain 
treatymaking and to ensure that ratified treaties had broad, cross-
regional support. Like Morris’s proposal to require implementing 
legislation for all treaties, the proposal to give the House of 
Representatives a treatymaking role would have diffused regional 
tensions by requiring approval from a national, directly-apportioned 
body.66 Requiring approval from a supermajority of the Senate—either 
the full body or just present members—would preserve the system of 
the Articles of Confederation, under which a minority of states could 
block any treaty.67 
 
 62.  2 RECORDS, supra note 60, at 392. 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Id. at 393. 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Id. at 538. 
 67.  Id. at 540. Numerous other proposals would have treated different types of treaties as 
more or less deserving of restraint. Id. For example, to facilitate the end of war when it was quickly 
needed, Madison suggested that peace treaties should be exempt from the supermajority 
requirement, and that the Senate should be able to conclude them without the president. Id. 
Delegates also suggested that the treaty power should subcategorize even further and still subject 
peace treaties to the supermajority requirement if they affected territorial rights. Id. at 540–41. 
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Given the importance of properly allocating treatymaking power 
within the new government and the many choices for how that power 
could be structured, the delegates ended their first major discussion of 
the treaty power by noting that “almost every Speaker had made 
objections to the clause as it stood.”68 When the Framers eventually 
settled on the final version, it was undoubtedly a political concession.69 
At the time the Constitution was written, states representing around 14 
percent of the population had enough votes in the Senate to block a 
treaty if their priorities aligned.70 In a new system generally predicated 
on majority rule, the Treaty Clause was an unusual departure. 
B. The Ratification Debates 
The ratification debates in Virginia and North Carolina show that 
the treaty power was an important factor for southern states in 
evaluating the new Constitution. Delegates who attacked the treaty 
power argued that Article II might fail to prevent treaties that 
exploited a minority of states. 
The treaty power was a significant sticking point for many critics of 
the Constitution in Virginia. Nearly 10 percent of pages in the printed 
debates from the Virginia convention are focused on the treaty power 
alone.71 The discussions reflected delegates’ serious skepticism that the 
treaty clause would sufficiently restrain northern states from 
disadvantaging the south.72 According to James Monroe, the proposed 
Constitution made treatymaking too easy because it required only the 
President and “[t]wo thirds of those [senators] who may happen to be 
present.”73 Implied in Monroe’s emphasis is the fear that senators from 
the north could conclude a treaty in a session with a sufficient quorum 
to conduct business, but without full representation from the south. 
Alluding to the south’s fear from the Jay-Gardoqui controversy, 
 
 68.  Id. at 393. 
 69.  See VAN CLEVE, supra note 7, at 289 (noting that to ensure ratification, “the convention 
had no political alternative but to make concessions to persistent sectional jealousies and states’ 
sovereignty claims,” including over the supermajority requirements for treaties and constitutional 
amendments). 
 70.  EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WORLD ORGANIZATION 48 (1944). 
 71.  Warren, supra note 38, at 297. 
 72.  See Banning, supra note 58, at 279–80 (noting that fear of northern domination 
characterized discussions at the Virginia ratification convention, and that it was the Mississippi 
controversy that best demonstrated the potential for sectional aggression to arise). 
 73.  3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT 
PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 221 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2nd ed. 1891) [hereinafter DEBATES]. 
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Monroe explained that “a very small number” of senators could 
“sacrifice the dearest interests of the Southern States” by ceding their 
territory.74 Patrick Henry argued similar points and expressly 
referenced the dispute over the Mississippi.75 Arguing that the Articles’ 
treaty power was diluted in the proposed Constitution, Henry 
explained, “While the consent of nine states is necessary to the cession 
of territory, you are safe. If it be put in the power of a less number, you 
will most infallibly lose the Mississippi.”76 
John Dawson, another delegate, framed the issue in even more 
striking collective action terms. For Dawson, concern over the 
Mississippi in particular was justified, but the Jay-Gardoqui 
controversy broadly illustrated that the treaty clause could enable a 
small group of states to pursue their own self-interest at the expense of 
other states and the union as a whole.77 For Dawson, the treaty power 
in the Articles had nearly ceded the Union’s hopes for western 
expansion.78 So even if the proposed treaty power in the new 
Constitution were equally as restraining, it would still fail to “guard 
against . . . a scheme, to which nothing but an inattention to the general 
interest of America, and a selfish regard to the interest of particular 
states, could have given rise.”79 The proposed Constitution’s treaty 
power thus appeared insufficient to stop the minority exploitation that 
the Articles of Confederation narrowly prevented. 
Delegates to the first North Carolina ratification convention also 
expressly referenced the Jay-Gardoqui controversy as they debated the 
proposed Constitution’s merits. Like Monroe, William Porter of North 
Carolina feared that the treaty power would enable minority state 
exploitation.80 The President and a small number of senators, he 
explained, “might give up the rivers and territory” of the southern 
states to make a treaty that advantaged the northern states but equally 
injured the south.81 In doing so, the northern states would pass off their 
 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  Id. at 141. 
 76.  Id. 
 77.  See id. at 609 (“My objections to it do not arise from a view of the particular situation of 
the western part of this state . . . but from an apprehension that the principle pervades all 
America, and that in its operation, it will be found highly injurious to the southern states.”). 
 78.  See id. at 610 (stating that the treaty power under the Articles had already given southern 
states “cause to tremble”). 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  4 DEBATES, supra note 73, at 115. 
 81.  Id. 
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regional interest as the national interest.82 If the President and two-
thirds of present senators were to have such power, Porter feared 
nothing would counsel them against abusing it.83 
Porter was not alone in his sentiment that the Treaty Clause created 
the potential for significant abuse of majority power. Timothy 
Bloodworth, another delegate to the North Carolina convention, 
indirectly commented on the treaty power as he emphasized what he 
perceived as government’s inherent tendency to expand its own 
authority.84 Bloodworth reminded his audience of the Jay-Gardoqui 
controversy to illustrate his point that “[e]very possible precaution 
should be taken” when granting powers.85 Although the Jay-Gardoqui 
treaty never became operative, it was enough for Bloodworth that a 
majority of states voted to sacrifice the Mississippi.86 That Congress 
reinstructed Jay despite lacking supermajority support vindicated 
Bloodworth’s fear of misplacing power and underscored that the 
Articles’ treaty power was all that stopped a northern majority from 
sacrificing the interests of a southern minority.87 
These examples from Virginia and North Carolina do not fully 
capture the diversity of southern delegates’ views on the treaty power. 
Some delegates to those conventions supported the Treaty Clause.88 
The Treaty Clause also had plenty of support elsewhere—Alexander 
Hamilton, for example, wrote that it was “one of the best digested and 
most unexceptionable parts” of the constitutional plan.89 For some 
federalists, defense of the treaty power reflected aspirations for a future 
of national unity. In this hopeful vision, the equally-represented states 
 
 82.  See id. (suggesting that northern states would ratify an exploitive treaty but that “in the 
preamble of the Constitution, they say all the people have done it”). 
 83.  See id. (“I should be glad to know what power there is of calling the President and Senate 
to account.”). 
 84.  Id. at 167. 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  See id. at 167–68 (“By [the Articles of Confederation], nine states are required to make 
a treaty; yet seven states said that they could . . . repeal part of the instructions given our secretary 
for foreign affairs, which prohibited him from making a treaty to give up the Mississippi to 
Spain . . . .”). 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  See, e.g., 3 DEBATES, supra note 73, at 500. James Madison argued at the Virginia 
Convention that the threat of impeachment would prevent the President from concluding unfair 
treaties. Id. Governor Samuel Johnson argued the same at the first North Carolina Convention 
and dismissed the concern that the Treaty Clause only required a supermajority of present 
senators because senators would not be absent if their states’ interests were at risk. 4 DEBATES, 
supra note 73, at 115. 
 89.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 75, at 387 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey & James 
McClellan eds., 2001). 
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would assume in the Senate “a national form, and a national character” 
that would remember “that the good of the whole can only be 
promoted by advancing the good of each of the parts” that comprise 
it.90 But whatever hopes some had for the future of the treaty power, 
the version enshrined in the Constitution arose not from unity, but from 
interstate distrust and fear of the tyrannical majority. 
IV. COLLECTIVE ACTION IMPLICATIONS OF THE TREATY POWER 
TODAY 
The historical conditions animating the treaty power carry much 
less weight today. The supermajority requirement no longer has to 
guard against the pronounced regional rivalries of 1787, and it likely 
precludes treatymaking where states would benefit from it. The modern 
preference for alternative forms of international agreements supports 
this assertion, as the federal government has found a work-around to 
treatymaking by using executive agreements instead. 
A.  Challenging the Treaty Power’s Assumptions 
As Part III illustrates, the Treaty Clause developed from two 
assumptions that arose during the Jay-Gardoqui controversy. The 
framers assumed that (1) some treaties would benefit a majority of 
states by threatening to exploit the opposing minority, and (2) senators 
would be sufficient bulwarks to prevent that exploitation from 
happening. But historical and political developments since the 
founding reduce the weight of these animating assumptions. 
First, southern concern over the Mississippi River became moot 
long ago—that debate ended in 1803 when the Louisiana Purchase 
secured permanent control of the Mississippi for the United States.91 
That control neutralizes what made the Jay-Gardoqui treaty such a 
salient example of minority exploitation: the clean split of its costs and 
benefits among the states based on the states’ narrow self-interests. The 
west was considered uniquely vital to the south’s future.92 Access to the 
 
 90.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 64, at 336 (John Jay) (George W. Carey & James McClellan eds., 
2001). 
 91.  Some scholars argue that the Louisiana Purchase was itself an unconstitutional exercise 
of the treaty power. See, e.g., Robert Knowles, The Balance of Forces and the Empire of Liberty: 
States’ Rights and the Louisiana Purchase, 88 IOWA L. REV. 343, 345 (2002). President Jefferson 
himself worried that it was unconstitutional—in rejecting the argument that purchasing the 
territory would be permissible because the treaty power was boundless, Jefferson wrote, “If it is, 
then we have no Constitution.” Id. at 346. 
 92.  See Banning, supra note 58, at 265 (“[A]s of 1786, the West was everywhere perceived 
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west was central to southern states’ understanding of their power in the 
union and to the future of slavery.93 Moreover, southerners—unlike 
most northerners—had familial connections and kinship with the 
newly settled westerners.94 A state’s position on the Jay-Gardoqui 
treaty could be predicted by its position on a map, because depending 
on where each state sat, it either received all of the benefits of the 
exchange or bore all of its costs.95 When ceding territory through a 
treaty was a real possibility, it made sense that a minority of states—
those most affected by the cession—should have had the power to 
defeat the treaty. 
However, modern analogs are unlikely to threaten minority state 
exploitation as plainly as the Jay-Gardoqui treaty did because 
America’s borders are settled, and treaties are unlikely to alter them in 
a significant way. A treaty today could still evoke a clear split between 
regions of the country. But that would likely result from ideological or 
partisan differences that tend to track the geography of states and not 
any factor that can itself determine which states enjoy the treaty’s 
benefits and which states internalize its costs.96 
For example, several treaties obligate signatories to abolish the 
death penalty in all or virtually all cases.97 If one such treaty came 
before the Senate, and if each senator voted consistent with her home 
state’s rule on the death penalty, the vote would split evenly along 
 
as an extension of the South.”). 
 93.  See Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties’ End: The Past, Present, and Future of International 
Lawmaking in the United States, 117 YALE L. J. 1236, 1283 (2008) (“Free trade and emigration 
were, in turn, viewed by many as essential to maintaining the South’s political clout in the new 
union, presumably thereby protecting the tenuous compromise over slavery by making it possible 
for new slave states to form in the south.”). 
 94.  See Banning, supra note 58, at 265 (“Settlers in Kentucky or in Tennessee were often 
literally the kin or former neighbors of important southern families, and a great deal more than 
family fortunes seemed at stake in their continued membership in the American union.”). 
 95.  See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 96.  A geography-based treaty split among the states would not be impossible today. For 
example, a treaty that sacrifices America’s control over Guam, might evoke strong objections 
from states in the western U.S. that would feel vulnerable without the geostrategic protection that 
Guam and other Pacific U.S. territories provide. But it is unlikely that eastern states today would 
be as willing to concede territory as the northern states were in the 1785 because, as Jay hoped in 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 64, the determination would take on a more national character. See supra 
note 90 and accompanying text. 
 97.  See, e.g., Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, aiming at abolition of the death penalty, G.A. Res. 44/128, 29 I.L.M. 1464 (1990); Protocol 
No. 6 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, concerning the abolition of the death penalty, Europ. T.S. No. 114 (entered into force 
Mar. 1, 1985). 
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roughly regional lines.98 States on the west coast and in the northeast 
and upper midwest have already abolished or restricted the death 
penalty, and states in the southeast and western heartland retain it for 
the most part.99 Because the vote would split with twenty-five states on 
either side, the treaty would fall far short of Article II’s supermajority 
requirement.100 This regional split is not unique to the death penalty—
for example, a treaty addressing climate change by setting greenhouse 
gas emission targets would likely track along those same geographical 
lines.101 
Because most modern treaties are unlikely to implicate the 
minority state exploitation that animated the Treaty Clause, it is 
difficult to see why the supermajority requirement should continue to 
restrain agreements for national issues like capital punishment or 
greenhouse gas emissions. To be sure, a self-executing treaty on one of 
those subjects would surely implicate federalism concerns just like 
analogous domestic lawmaking. But if the supermajority requirement 
for treaties were bypassed, each state would still have a voice under a 
majority threshold in the Senate—or a sixty-vote threshold to invoke 
cloture—just like they do for domestic legislation. 
One could still argue that each state needs more of a voice when 
the federal government is considering action that will bind states 
collectively on the international stage.102 Under that reasoning, fidelity 
to Article II is what gives treaties their status as binding law.103 Thus, 
 
 98.  State by State, THE DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-
and-federal-info/state-by-state (last visited Mar. 3, 2021). 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  Id. This split does not reflect the efforts to end capital punishment in Virginia that are 
in-progress as of the time of writing on March 3, 2021. See Laura Vozzella & Gregory S. Schneider, 
Lawmakers Vote to Make Virginia First Southern State to Abolish Death Penalty, WASH. POST 
(Feb. 22, 2021, 2:50 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/virginia-politics/virginia-death-
penalty-ban/2021/02/22/742eed3e-7146-11eb-93be-c10813e358a2_story.html (“Two bills to 
abolish the death penalty in Virginia won final approval in the state General Assembly on 
Monday and were headed to Gov. Ralph Northam (D), who is expected to sign them.”). 
 101.  State Climate Policy Maps; Greenhouse Gas Emissions Targets, THE CTR. FOR CLIMATE 
& ENERGY SOLS., https://www.c2es.org/content/state-climate-policy/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2021). 
 102.  See Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form 
Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1246–47 (1995) (“The United 
States Constitution tries to define with some precision the processes that determine which laws, 
treaties, or agreements will in fact be binding upon us. We must look to the procedural 
requirements of these enabling provisions to evaluate the validity of something purporting to be 
law.”). 
 103.  See id. at 1247 (“We can know that something has the binding force of law only if it 
complies with the requirements that, as a matter of social fact, we have agreed must be met when 
law is to be made.”). 
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“architectural provisions [of the Constitution] that specify the 
processes by which government is to effect legal change, such as . . . the 
Treaty Clause of Article II, clearly demand a fairly rigid definition.”104 
But internationally-binding non-Article II agreements have their own 
basis in the Constitution, and historical practice has long-since rejected 
formal adherence to the Article II treaty process.105 
Second, political changes to the Senate challenge the Treaty 
Clause’s assumption that senators will primarily protect their states in 
the treatymaking process. The Seventeenth Amendment likely changed 
the extent to which senators represent their particular states’ interests 
by providing that senators would take office through direct popular 
election instead of appointment by state legislatures.106 Senate 
candidates instead must appeal to voters, not state legislators. If voters 
are less adept at recognizing—or less persuaded by—Senate 
candidates’ positions on treaties as compared to other issues, this 
change likely reduces the extent to which each senator represents her 
state as a player in the treatymaking process.107 One can argue that the 
states’ interests should be better represented in the treaty process than 
they currently are. But that is a separate, normative claim, which admits 
that if the Article II supermajority requirement looks to senators to 
protect state interests, it may do so in vain. 
B.  The Modern Use of Non-Article II Treaties 
The collective action understanding of the Treaty Clause becomes 
more persuasive in light of the modern U.S. practice for international 
agreements. The vast majority of international agreements that the U.S. 
joins today are not completed through the Article II treaty process.108 
 
 104.  Id. at 1248. 
 105.  See Part IV.B, infra. 
 106.  U.S. CONST. amend. XVII; see Sean Gailmard & Jeffery A. Jenkins, Agency Problems, 
the 17th Amendment, and Representation in the Senate, 53 AM. J. POL. SCI. 324, 332 (2009) 
(analyzing Senate voting records before and after the Seventeenth Amendment and concluding 
that after its passage, “senators became substantially less responsive to the policy interests of the 
state legislature”); see also AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 412 
(2005) (discussing the effects of the Seventeenth Amendment and noting that after it, senators 
were “[l]iberated from all dependence on state governments” and “freer to pursue policies that 
state officials might not like”). 
 107.  See Lewis B. Kaden, Politics, Money, and State Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79 
COLUM. L. REV. 847, 863 (1979) (“As Senators and Members of the House develop independent 
constituencies among groups such as farmers, businessmen, laborers, environmentalists, and the 
poor, each of which generally supports certain national initiatives, their tendency to identify with 
state interests and the positions of state officials is reduced.”). 
 108.  See Hathaway, supra note 93, at 1287 (“Congressional-executive agreements have thus 
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Instead, most agreements proceed as either congressional-executive 
agreements or sole executive agreements.109 The prevalence of 
executive agreements over treaties and the debate over the 
interchangeability of the two agreement forms likely suggest—
consistent with collective action reasoning—that the Article II treaty 
process indeed over-restrains treatymaking.110 
Executive agreements are international agreements that the U.S. 
joins outside the Article II treaty process. Executive agreements are 
either concluded by the President alone (sole executive agreements) or 
with Congress’s authorization (congressional-executive agreements).111 
Congressional-executive agreements can have either ex ante or ex post 
authorization from Congress.112 Ex post approvals are negotiated by the 
executive branch before going to Congress for an up or down vote.113 
Ex ante congressional-executive agreements do not go to Congress for 
a final vote—the executive branch forms them alone based on earlier 
statutory authorization, and they come into force when their party 
nations sign them.114 
Executive agreements have existed since the time of America’s 
founding.115 But most of America’s early international agreements 
were formed as treaties—between 1789 and 1839, the United States 
 
been present at nearly every period of American history, but they have rapidly grown more 
numerous and important since the 1940s.”). 
 109.  Id. 
 110.  See id. at 1307–37 (arguing that in the vast majority of cases where treaties and executive 
agreements are legally interchangeable, executive agreements should be preferred because they 
have stronger democratic legitimacy, require a less cumbersome process, and lead to more 
reliable international commitments). 
 111.  Hathaway, supra note 93, at 1239. The President forms a sole executive agreement 
without any formal action from Congress. Id. In that sense, sole executive agreements represent 
the opposite extreme of treaties in America’s international lawmaking—whereas Article II 
treaties have a high procedural bar that restrains collective action, sole executive agreements are 
barred mostly by political checks. Id. But to note that difference is not to suggest easier 
international lawmaking is always better. Id. Unilateral lawmaking presents its own challenges, 
including restrained negotiating power and lessened democratic legitimacy. Id.; see also Oona A. 
Hathaway, Presidential Power over International Law: Restoring the Balance, 119 YALE L. J. 140, 
147 (2009) [hereinafter Presidential Power] (noting that Presidents may struggle to build political 
support for agreements concluded without input from Congress, and that negotiating with 
Congress’s input may enable a President to make concessions that would otherwise be 
unavailable). 
 112.  Hathaway, supra note 93, at 1259. 
 113.  Presidential Power, supra note 111, at 149. 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  For example, a 1792 Act of Congress authorized the Postmaster General to “make 
arrangements with the postmasters in any foreign country for the reciprocal receipt and delivery” 
of mail. Act of Feb. 20, 1792, ch. 7, § 26, 1 Stat. 232, 239. 
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made sixty treaties and twenty-seven executive agreements.116 In each 
successive fifty-year period, the balance shifted away from the treaty 
process and towards executive agreements.117 The trend is pronounced, 
particularly in recent years: between 2001 and 2016, the United States 
concluded 3,021 executive agreements and only 132 treaties.118 The 
numerical shift alone suggests that the treaty power is not an effective 
facilitator of the country’s high demand for international agreements. 
Moreover, the lack of a meaningful distinction for when each type 
of agreement is used supports the suggestion that the treaty power’s 
reasons for restraining collective action are less persuasive today. There 
is a limited connection between the substantive focus of an 
international agreement and the particular form of agreement used.119 
Discernible patterns for choosing one agreement form versus another 
exist, but some scholars argue that those patterns are not based on any 
rational principle.120 
The current system took hold over the twentieth century and can 
be explained by America’s growing appetite for international trade and 
regional opposition to human rights treaties.121 As the country 
benefitted from international agreements, the Treaty Clause’s 
procedural protections became overly burdensome.122 But as the reach 
of non-Article II agreements grew, certain categories of agreement still 
evaded its grasp. When some senators perceived that human rights 
treaties would threaten segregation and Jim Crow, they proposed 
constitutional amendments to prevent the United States from entering 
those agreements.123 After President Eisenhower campaigned against 
the amendments, the conflict ended in a compromise: The amendments 
 
 116.  CONG. RES. SERV., S. PRT. 106-71, TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL 
AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE 39 (2001). 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  Jeffrey S. Peake, The Decline of Treaties? Obama, Trump, and the Politics of 
International Agreements 40 (Apr. 6, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3153840. 
 119.  Hathaway, supra note 93, at 1239. 
 120.  See id. at 1239–40 (noting content-based patterns for Article II treaties versus executive 
agreements and concluding that there is “no persuasive explanation . . . based on subject matter, 
form, topic, or any other substantive basis”). 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  See id. (asserting that executive agreements first enabled the country’s abandonment of 
trade protectionism in favor of reciprocal trade agreements and “subsequently expanded to 
include almost every area of international law”). 
 123.  See id. at 1303 (characterizing the amendments, referred to collectively as the Bricker 
Amendment, as a “thinly veiled effort to prevent the use of international human rights 
agreements to curtail racial segregation in the United States”). 
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would fail, thus preserving executive power over foreign affairs, but the 
United States would not join the growing collection of human rights 
treaties.124 With this context, the line between Article II treaties and 
other international agreements appears motivated by disagreement 
over human rights obligations rather than a distinction between 
procedural mechanisms for any particular agreement. 
V.  CRITICISMS AND LIMITS OF THE COLLECTIVE ACTION 
FRAMEWORK FOR THE TREATY POWER 
Collective action reasoning can provide a useful framework for 
understanding the treaty power. But that framework may be vulnerable 
to criticism based on the Constitution’s text and a closer look at the 
modern use of Article II treaties and executive agreements. Moreover, 
even if, despite its faults, the collective action framework remains 
useful, its utility is still limited by the antecedent question of whether a 
proposed international agreement implicates minority state 
exploitation at all. 
First, the treaty is the only form of international agreement that the 
Constitution expressly provides.125 Insofar as the collective action 
understanding of the treaty power favors congressional-executive 
agreements over the excessively restrained Article II process, it must 
be reconciled with the textual absence of a Congressional-Executive 
Agreement Clause. But non-Article II agreements have their own 
bases in the text and historical practice. Article I clearly contemplates 
that Congress will act on the international stage without going through 
the treaty process,126 and early America made both Article II treaties 
and congressional-executive agreements.127 In addition, the Supreme 
Court has held that “all international compacts and agreements” are 
entitled to federal supremacy, just as treaties are.128 More 
 
 124.  Id. at 1303–04 (explaining that the Bricker Amendment had a lasting impact by delaying 
U.S. entry into many international human rights agreements and by laying the groundwork to 
render those that the U.S. has joined unenforceable through reservations, understandings, and 
declarations). 
 125.  LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 174 (1972) (“The 
Constitution expressly prescribes the treaty procedure, and nowhere suggests that another 
method of making international agreements is available, and that it would do as well.”). 
 126.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (authorizing Congress to, among other powers, regulate 
commerce with foreign nations, define and punish violations of the law of nations, and declare 
war). 
 127.  See Hathaway, supra note 93, at 1287 (“In the first half century of its independence, the 
United States ratified sixty treaties but joined only twenty-seven published executive 
agreements.”). 
 128.  See United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937) (explaining that all international 
BEACH_03_16_21_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 3/17/2021  7:20 PM 
302 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 16 
fundamentally, to read the Treaty Clause as prohibiting other types of 
agreements is itself an interpretation that requires justification. For 
example, the Declare War Clause does not practically prevent the 
President from using military force without authorization in what 
common parlance would deem acts of war. 129 Similarly, the Treaty 
Clause need not be read to restrain non-Article II agreements when 
the collective action justifications for the Treaty Clause’s supermajority 
requirement are not implicated. 
Congressional-executive agreements may still provoke some 
discomfort from a textual perspective. These agreements raise 
questions that Article II treaties do not, such as whether a veto-proof 
majority could pass an international agreement over the President’s 
disapproval.130 But acknowledging that collective action reasoning 
favors executive agreements over Article II treaties in some cases does 
not require one to argue for full interchangeability between the two 
agreement types. 
Second, the collective action understanding does not fully explain 
the current practice surrounding international agreements. Although it 
helps illuminate why non-Article II agreements have come to 
predominate over traditional treaties, it does not explain why certain 
types of agreements are directed through one mechanism or the other. 
If collective action explained this split, Article II treaties would be 
those that raise a greater risk of exploiting a minority of states. In 
theory, this sorting of agreements would occur through political checks. 
If the President signaled plans for a new international agreement that 
was potentially exploitive, senators could protect minority states by 
conditioning their support on adherence to the Article II process. But 
no such pattern presents itself, so collective action reasoning cannot 
explain why some groups of agreements are seemingly administered 
through Article II while others are not.131 
Moreover, collective action reasoning may only justify or explain 
the use of some non-Article II agreements. To use collective action 
 
agreements are free from the states’ interference because “complete power over international 
affairs is in the national government”). 
 129.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11; see, e.g., Libya and War Powers: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 112th Cong. 14–16 (2011) (statement of Harold Hongju Koh, Legal 
Adviser, Dep’t of State) (arguing that President Obama did not need Congress’s approval to 
continue air strikes in Libya). 
 130.  See generally Tribe, supra note 102 (rejecting a flexible interpretation of the Treaty 
Clause). 
 131.  See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
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reasoning to support congressional-executive agreements as sensible 
workarounds to the Article II treaty process assumes that the 
agreements enable more collective action than treaties while still giving 
a say to the states acting through Congress. But that assumption is 
wholly untrue for sole executive agreements, and it is substantially 
weakened even for ex ante congressional-executive agreements. The 
executive branch makes sole executive agreements without any formal 
input from Congress, and although ex ante congressional-executive 
agreements hook onto authorizing statutes, they do not go back to 
Congress before they become operative.132 Thus, legislators do not cast 
final up or down votes on sole executive agreements or on ex ante 
congressional executive agreements, even though the agreements bind 
the U.S. on the international stage just as Article II treaties do.133 So 
even if collective action reasoning explains why relatively few of the 
country’s international agreements are concluded through Article II, it 
does not fully justify the large portion of non-Article II agreements that 
are formed without up or down votes from Congress.134 
Finally, even if one accepts the collective action understanding of 
the treaty power as a useful framework, it cannot fully answer which 
proposed agreements distribute costs and benefits among the states so 
unevenly that they should go through the Article II process. Identifying 
which agreements pose the greatest risk of minority state exploitation 
is likely a value-driven question on which objective agreement would 
be difficult. Moreover, the Senate itself would likely be the body that 
signals that the President must push an agreement through one 
mechanism or the other. But if an agreement had enough support to 
pass the Senate as a congressional-executive agreement, it is unlikely 





 132.  Hathaway, supra note 93, at 1255–56. 
 133.  See Presidential Power, supra note 111, at 150 (noting the lack of formal Congressional 
involvement in concluding sole executive agreements and ex ante congressional-executive 
agreements and claiming that “few outside the executive branch even know of their existence 
until after they have become binding on the United States”). 
 134.  See id. at 155 (“Between 1990 and 2000, for example, approximately twenty percent of 
all executive agreements were sole executive agreements. The remaining eighty percent were 
congressional-executive agreements.”). 
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CONCLUSION 
Collective action problems arise when actors need to work together 
to achieve a shared outcome but are either unable to do so or incentives 
discourage cooperation. Collective action is unlikely when it requires 
unanimous approval from the group. When groups work on majority 
rule, they can act more easily. But changing the threshold for action 
from unanimity to something less raises the risk that majority power 
will become majority tyranny. 
The states struggled to solve collective action problems under the 
Articles of Confederation. Some provisions of the Constitution can be 
understood as facilitating collective action by creating a federal 
government that could act on majority rule. The Treaty Clause is 
another instance of withholding a power from the states and giving it 
to the federal government, but its supermajority requirement restrains 
collective action by setting a threshold for action between unanimity 
and mere majority rule. 
Responding largely to the acute historical controversy over the Jay-
Gardoqui treaty negotiations, the Framers gave a minority of states the 
power to limit collective action when they perceived that a treaty would 
unfairly burden them to other states’ benefit. This collective action 
understanding of the treaty power suggests that its supermajority 
requirement is most important for agreements that would enable a 
majority of states to exploit a minority of states. 
Today, the factors that animated the treaty power’s supermajority 
requirement are no longer as relevant as they once were. Political and 
historical changes challenge the assumptions behind the treaty power. 
Because modern treaties are unlikely to exploit minority states in the 
way the Framers had feared, agreements that bypass Article II are 
reasonable workarounds to an overly-restraining supermajority 
requirement. The collective action framework cannot be applied as a 
formula to identify when a proposed agreement will distribute costs 
and benefits so poorly that it portends exploitation of a minority of 
states. But understanding the Treaty Clause’s relationship to collective 
action can highlight that in most modern cases, the Clause’s restraint 
on international agreements is unwarranted. 
